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DIGNITY RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO PEGGY 
COOPER DAVIS’S “LITTLE CITIZENS AND 
THEIR FAMILIES” 
Jane M. Spinak* 
Peggy Cooper Davis has proposed that human dignity shoulders 
the burden of managing—if not resolving—the complex relationship 
of the state to the family as an entity and to the individual members 
of that entity, in particular the child.1  She is not alone in asking 
dignity to do this hard work.  Supreme Court Justice Anthony 
Kennedy has placed dignity at the center of our understanding of the 
state’s role in intimate relationships.2  Defining dignity is difficult, 
however, and the specific “smell test” for its use that Davis proposes 
reaches beyond the “histories and traditions” that have identified a 
dignity right as fundamental and worthy of protection to consider two 
additional circumstances.3  One is the development of international 
human rights standards since the end of World War II, and the second 
is to consider under what conditions the victim of an affront to their 
dignity—and the rest of us—finds that affront intolerable.  The 
verifying source of this test is the resistance to this treatment through 
counterdemonstration and reasoned protest.4  What complicates the 
analysis in the family context is the competing dignity rights of the 
individual members of the family and the family as an entity entitled 
to its own dignitary respect. 
                                                                                                                                         
* Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would 
like to thank the organizers of the 2015 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, Flourishing 
Families in Context, for inviting me to participate in the symposium and respond to 
Professor Peggy Cooper Davis’ remarks; I also thank the editors of Fordham Urban 
Law Journal for their assistance in publishing this response.  Finally I would like to 
thank Professor Jason Parkin, who organized, and Professor Wendy Bach, who 
moderated, a panel at the 2016 AALS Annual Meeting that directly led to this 
response. 
 1. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Little Citizens and Their Families, 43 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1009, 1009, 1013–14 (2016). 
 2. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–94, 2599, 2606, 2608 (2015). 
 3. See Davis, supra note 1, at 1010–11, 1013. 
 4. Id. at 1013. 
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Nowhere is this complexity more clearly identified than in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the global 
community’s statement of commitment to nurturing and supporting 
the best interests of the child.5  Those interests are served, first and 
foremost, by respecting and protecting the family: 
[T]he family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and 
particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection 
and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within 
the community . . . [and] the child, for the full and harmonious 
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding.6 
After situating the child’s best interests firmly in the family, the 
Convention then compels the state and its institutions to protect the 
child and her family against discrimination, ensure that state action to 
protect the child’s best interests be taken only after consideration of 
the role of the child’s parents, and to support the economic, social, 
and cultural rights of those children, as enumerated in subsequent 
articles of the Convention.7  The child is not, however, only a creature 
of the family or the state.  Rather, the child is an emerging individual 
with perspectives, ideas, interests, and beliefs, all worthy of support 
and protection.8  Davis refines our conception of human dignity by 
employing international human rights standards to augment the 
American constitutional meaning of the term.9  She implicitly (and in 
her conclusion perhaps explicitly) proposes what the CRC has already 
recognized: that the tensions inherent in the “child-family-state” 
triangle can be mitigated by the provision of positive obligations by 
the state.10  That is, families cannot be the nurturing protective site 
where children grow, thrive, and develop to their full capacities 
without affirmative and sustained assistance from the state in the 
many facets of the child’s life: education, health, food, and shelter at a 
minimum.  The “thoughtful and simultaneous respect” that Davis 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”). 
 6. Id. at preamble. 
 7. Id. arts. 2–4. 
 8. Id. arts. 12–16. 
 9. See Davis, supra note 1, at 1012. 
 10. Id. at 1021. 
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advances to manage these tensions is,11 in many ways, a call for the 
state to take an affirmative role in creating and sustaining the object 
of this colloquium: flourishing families.  Yet to get there requires not 
only difficult conversations about supporting families, but also 
renewed attention to constitutional rights to address significant and 
growing inequity. 
Let’s start with having the conversation.  In her wonderful book, 
Failure to Flourish, Clare Huntington identifies how different moral 
beliefs about the state’s role in family life impact our ability to talk 
across those differences to support families.12  The competing moral 
systems employ strict-father and nurturing-parent metaphors to 
ascertain the appropriate role of government in family life.13  In the 
strict-father system, the government’s role is to promote morality, 
self-discipline, and self-reliance, while in the nurturing-parent system 
the state promotes fairness, self-fulfillment, and helping those in 
need.14  Huntington notes these moral systems are hardened by our 
tendency to discount factual information that is not consistent with 
our beliefs15 and, as Davis pointed out many years ago, our tendency 
not to change our minds but to maintain the status quo.16  These 
moral system metaphors analogize, if imperfectly, to negative and 
positive rights theories: the protection from government intervention 
rather than promotion of government support. 
Huntington has contributed to having conversations that bridge 
such a serious divide in many ways—including identifying why it is so 
hard to have the conversations17—but I want to focus on her effort to 
debunk the paradigm of the autonomous family and to surface, from 
what has been termed “the submerged state,” how all families get and 
need state support.18  Then I want to move more front and center the 
burgeoning inequality in our country that requires us to rethink our 
ideas about rights and ultimately our understanding of dignity. 
Huntington pinpoints how government programs assist all families, 
only differently.  For most majority and upper-income-families, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. Id. at 1014. 
 12. CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 207–11 (2014). 
 13. Id. at 208. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 209. 
 16. Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at 
Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 145–46 
(1995). 
 17. HUNTINGTON, supra note 12, at 207–11. 
 18. Id. at 71–73. 
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benefits the state provides respect privacy and do not come with 
intrusive and demeaning requirements: home mortgage deductions, 
an ability to live in school districts with better schools, and 
government-backed student loans serve as examples.  Public 
education is just available—Huntington calls it background noise19—
and many other programs require little more than checking a box or 
filling out a form.  These families do not experience the government 
as messing in their lives.20  Programs that provide a safety net, such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), require 
substantial paperwork, invasive certification interviews, regular 
recertification meetings, and varied conditions of receipt beyond 
financial need.21  For many minority and low-income families, instead 
of friends with benefits, they get benefits with friends: a constant 
stream of government officials invading and interrupting their lives.22  
These families experience the state without the dignity that Davis 
hopes will mediate the child-family-state tension and the supports 
that Huntington hopes will make families flourish.  And the assistance 
they do get often exacerbates their troubles. 
Poverty remains an intractable problem in the United States.  In 
the half-century since President Lyndon Johnson launched his War on 
Poverty, the poverty rate has barely been reduced from nineteen 
percent to fifteen percent with forty-six million Americans now living 
in households with barely adequate income.23  During the same 
period, the “great compression” of the post-World War II era that 
built a political economy of the middle class, especially of white men, 
and harkened the possibility of greater racial and gender equality 
ended, and the distributive patterns of the Gilded Age reemerged.24  
Children’s extreme poverty increased in the United States by seventy-
five percent between 1995 and 2005 with fifteen million Americans 
living in this deep poverty.25  This inequity is intensified by the re-
                                                                                                                                         
 19. Id. at 72. 
 20. Id. at 72, 78. 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012); Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and 
Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 4–6 (2008). 
 22. Gilman, supra note 21, at 2, 5. 
 23. Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 793 
(2014). 
 24. Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 669, 693–94 (2014). 
 25. Tahk, supra note 23, at 834. 
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segregation of America’s schools.26  And the strict-father approach to 
poor families has triumphed from the Clinton-era dismantling of the 
welfare system to monitoring the contents of food stamp recipients’ 
shopping carts.27 
How does this combination of factors affect Davis’s proposal of 
dignity rights mediating the relationship between the family, child, 
and state?  By some accounts, the possibilities look grim.  
Anthropologist and legal scholar Khiara Bridges has challenged the 
idea that poor families, especially those headed by women and 
women of color, even have dignity rights to lose.  In her ethnographic 
study of women applying for the Medicaid Prenatal Care Assistance 
Program (MCAP), Bridges exposes the invasive and demeaning 
requirements to receive publicly financed prenatal care.28  Bridges 
argues that poverty has stripped away the traditional privacy rights 
enjoyed by families, exposing them to extreme scrutiny and setting 
conditions in areas of their lives that have nothing to do, in this 
instance, with the prenatal health of their child.29  Bridges contends 
that impoverished families are denied the presumption that parents 
will do their best to raise their children and the state will only 
interfere when the children are at risk.30  Instead, impoverished 
families’ failure to achieve economic self-sufficiency denies them that 
presumption.31  In other words, since these families cannot be 
presumed to raise their children well and in ways that will make them 
productive citizens, they are subject to such extreme and pervasive 
scrutiny when they seek government assistance that they become 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. See Nikole Hannah-Jones, Segregation Now, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 16, 2014, 
11:00 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/segregation-now-full-text 
[https://perma.cc/S5CN-RHT7]. 
 27. See Alan Pyke, How the Conservative Obsession with Policing Poor People’s 
Shopping Carts Got Started, THINKPROGRESS (May 12, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/05/12/3657467/food-stamps-junk-food-ban-
history/ [https://perma.cc/TT8N-47Z2]. 
 28. See Khiara Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 113, 127–35 (2011). 
 29. Id. at 164–65.  These rights could alternatively be framed as family autonomy 
or family integrity.  The Supreme Court, after reviewing the cases that established 
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court,” 
concluded: “In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of 
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 
children.”  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000). 
 30. Bridges, supra note 28, at 162–64. 
 31. Id. at 152–53. 
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“public families” without privacy rights at all.  They have not lost 
them by bartering for essential health care; they never had them.32 
It is not that [these] patients, because of their poverty, do not have 
presumptions of privacy; rather, their privacy is presumed altogether 
nonexistent.  So framed, it does not appear that wealth helps to buy 
the presumption of privacy, but rather wealth is the condition of 
possibility for privacy.33 
In characterizing the non-existence of privacy rights for these 
families, Bridges warns that even if rights were reformulated to be 
positive obligations—rights to rather than against the government as 
Davis suggests and the CRC provides—such rights would still be 
meaningless for poor families.34 
Are there ways around this dispiriting formulation?  While 
Huntington’s effort to surface the ways that the state assists all 
families will help, the significant difference in the way that assistance 
is structured reinforces Bridges’s point.  Tax scholar Susannah Camic 
Tahk has reported that tax-embedded programs engender more 
bipartisan support and that the public supports tax-embedded 
programs more favorably than cash assistance programs.35  The 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the prime example.  The EITC 
has been rightly hailed for lifting millions of children out of poverty.36  
Tahk shows, however, that when Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) was the country’s primary anti-poverty program 
before Clinton’s welfare reform, AFDC filled an average of about 
twenty-one percent of the poverty gap while, despite the increased 
spending on EITC in the first decade of this century, the EITC only 
fills about 5.4 of the poverty gap.37  And yet EITC is twice as 
effective at filling the poverty gap as TANF, the current cash 
assistance program.38  Critically, the EITC does not impact families in 
extreme poverty because it requires income other than public 
benefits, leaving these families out entirely.39  Including these families 
in a tax-based structure may be the only program solution in a strict-
father system because, as Tahk concludes: 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. at 168–71. 
 33. Id. at 172. 
 34. Id. at 174. 
 35. See Tahk, supra note 23, at 822–25. 
 36. Id. at 801–02. 
 37. Id. at 802–03. 
 38. Id. at 803. 
 39. Id.  Tahk recommends ways to counter this problem through improvements 
on the tax-based approach to poverty. See generally id. at 837–51. 
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Insofar as the non-tax war on poverty lacks political viability, the 
real choice for policymakers and advocates may not be between the 
tax and the non-tax war, but between the flawed tax war on poverty 
and no war on poverty at all.40 
Using an improved tax-based system may diminish the intrusive 
nature of government assistance for families in deep poverty, even 
helping to reinstate the privacy rights Bridges says have disappeared.  
Yet this remains a political, not a constitutional, response to the 
inequities at the heart of this inquiry.  And political solutions do not 
provide the same assurances as articulations and defenses of 
constitutional rights. 
Bridges contends that economic self-sufficiency is the basis for 
securing family dignity rights.  Legal scholars Joseph Fishkin and 
William Forbath offer a way to reimagine securing that self-
sufficiency by asking us to reconsider the very way that we 
understand the Constitution.  Alarmed by persistent poverty, a 
shrinking middle class and a wealthy, entrenched elite, they contend 
that the political-economic problem of this growing inequity is also a 
constitutional problem and was understood to be so for a significant 
period in our history.41  In The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution they 
explore “makes demands on our economic and political order—and 
that among those demands is the need to avoid oligarchy.”42  Equal 
citizenship and equal opportunity cannot be achieved within an 
oligarchy, and all three branches of government are responsible for 
achieving those objectives.43  This understanding was lost, they argue, 
as the Constitution in the second half of the twentieth century came 
to mean, “the Court-enforced Constitution” where anti-oligarchical 
principles have been erased.44  Nevertheless, they hope that the time 
is right for renewing our historic understanding that all branches of 
government share responsibility for the “nation’s constitutional 
political economy” because “[e]xtreme concentrations of economic 
and political power undermine equal citizenship and equal 
opportunity [making] oligarchy . . . incompatible with, and a threat to, 
the American constitutional scheme.”45 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. Id. at 826 (emphasis in original).  Tahk recommends ways to accomplish this 
goal. See generally id. at 837–51. 
 41. Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 24, at 670–71. 
 42. Id. at 673. 
 43. See id. at 693. 
 44. Id. at 692–93. 
 45. Id. 
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Let’s tie together the various threads of this essay, circle back to 
Davis’s dignity test, and apply it to a specific subject that deeply 
implicates the relationship among the family, child and state: the right 
to an education.  As Davis outlines, the “public school cases” provide 
a template for understanding Fourteenth Amendment family liberty 
jurisprudence.46  The state can require children to be educated, but 
parents retain some prerogative over the kind and place of that 
learning.  Children are the recipients of this “balance” but are not 
independently entitled to pursue their own educational interests.47  
The Court may have established an important principle of family 
autonomy, but Davis warns that the price may have been losing “our 
best collective response to class-based gaps in the quality of childhood 
education—gaps that grow as they mirror and perpetuate an 
expanding crisis of income disparity.”48  That collective response was 
further imperiled by the Court’s decision in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which failed to hold that 
children had a constitutional right to an education.49  Davis’s dignity 
test, along with the lessons learned from the scholars considered 
earlier, revives the possibility of securing that right to the benefit of 
children, parents, and the state. 
Davis’s test enhances the understanding of dignity rights in two 
ways:  applying human rights protections and employing collective 
resistance to intolerable conditions.50  The human rights protections 
that most closely align with a careful balance among the family, child, 
and state are elucidated in the CRC and offer the best standard to 
counter Chief Justice John Roberts’s contention that “[o]ur cases 
have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield 
provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive 
entitlements from the State.”51  The Court has already used the CRC 
as a shield, invoking it as a basis for prohibiting the juvenile death 
penalty,52 so the possibility of using human rights standards as a 
sword are less unfathomable than they were when Rodriguez was first 
decided.  Moreover, if we apply the test’s second prong—resistance to 
intolerable conditions—the current state of inequity in our country 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. See Davis, supra note 1, at 1009. 
 47. See id. at 1015–19 (describing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce 
v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972)). 
 48. Id. at 1016. 
 49. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 50. Davis, supra note 1, at 1012–13. 
 51. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005). 
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demands exploring every avenue to diminish that inequity, including 
revisiting our constitutional interpretation of basic rights.  Brown v. 
Board of Education identified the right to education within the 
balancing test of family dignity by declaring: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition 
of the importance of education to our democratic society.  It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms.53 
The anti-oligarchy framework entreats us to revisit Brown’s 
declaration in light of current economic conditions and re-
segregation.54 
Resistance can be employed in a second way.  Obergefell sets a 
standard for dignity that recognizes “that new insights and societal 
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most 
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and 
unchallenged.”55  The work that has been done to find a right to 
education has taken many forms: in pursuing the right in state 
constitutions, in finding new bases for re-litigating Rodriguez, in 
organizing grassroots efforts to amend the Constitution, and in 
congressional efforts to improve education systems or even create a 
federal statutory right to education.56  These efforts help to provide 
the unnoticed insights and understandings that mirror the remarkable 
transformation of our understanding of intimacy rights in 
relationships.  Joshua Weishart, in Reconstituting the Right to 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 54. See Hannah-Jones, supra note 26; Patrick Wall & Monica Disare, Small 
Number of Schools Enrolls Large Share of Public Housing Residents, Report Says, 
CHALKBEAT (Jan. 15, 2016, 7:11 PM), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2016/01/15/small-
number-of-schools-enrolls-large-share-of-public-housing-residents-report-
says/#.Vp1fccCANBe [https://perma.cc/SXZ5-ETDE]. 
 55. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 56. Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 
915, 918–20 (2016). 
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Education, reminds us that “if there is a federal constitutional right to 
education, its principal function is to protect children, and thereby, 
society at large.”57  This protection is against the harms of racial 
discrimination and education deprivation that will disadvantage them 
in their lives as citizens and in the market economy.58  If wealth is 
“the condition of possibility” of rights that Bridges alleges,59 then 
children must be protected from this education deprivation or face 
exile from their place in the market and in the democratic process.  
When Justice Kennedy wrote that “[o]utlaw to outcast may be a step 
forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty,” he 
echoed Bridges’s warning that poor families now live outside the 
protection of the constitutional right to dignity that Obergefell has 
articulated.60  We must bring them back inside for their sake and for 
ours. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 57. Id. at 956. 
 58. Id. at 957–58. 
 59. Bridges, supra note 28, at 172. 
 60. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
